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Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright
By JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.*
I must reveal at the outset my total bias for Chief Judge J. Skelly
Wright, my warm, close friend for some eighteen years. I take great
pride that every list of the outstanding judges of our time includes his
name. He presides over what a newsmagazine very recently labelled-
and accurately--"[t]he second most important court in the nation' ' -
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.
Lively, even acrimonious, debate about the proper role of judges
in a democratic society is ever with us. The judge who believes that the
judicial power should be made creative and vigorously effective is la-
belled "activist." The judge inclined to question the propriety of judi-
cial intervention to redress even the most egregious failures of
democracy is labelled "neutralist" or "passivist." The labels are not
synonymous with "conservative" or "liberal"; where yesterday "ac-
tivist" was pinned on liberals, today it's on conservatives. As often as
not, however, such labels are used merely to express disapproval of a
judge's particular decisions. If useful at all, the labels may be more
serviceable to distinguish the judge who sees his role as guided by the
principle that "justice or righteousness is the source, the substance and
the ultimate end of the law," and the judge for whom the principle is
that "courts do not sit to administer justice, but to administer the law."
Such legendary names as Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand
have been associated with the latter view. Holmes' imaginary Society
of Jobbists is limited to judges who hold a tight rein on humanitarian
impulse and compassionate action, stoically doing their best to discover
and apply already existing rules. But judges acting on the former view
believe that the judicial process demands a good deal more of them
than that. Because constitutions, statutes and precedent rarely speak
unambiguously, a just choice between competing alternatives has to be
made to decide concrete cases. A distinguished law dean has gone to
the heart of the problem in saying ". . . the judge's role necessarily is a
* Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
I. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 99.
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creative one-he must legislate; there is no help for it . . . when the
critical moment comes and he must say yea or nay, he is on his own; he
has nothing to rely on but his own intellect, experience and con-
science." 2
Chief Judge Wright has emphatically affirmed that he is not a Job-
bist in the area of equal rights for the disadvantaged. In his Francis
Biddle Lecture at Harvard he assured us "[In] the area of equal rights
for disadvantaged minorities . . . I remain an uncompromising 'ac-
tivist'."'3 In that area, in other words, he is of that school which believes
that law "constitutes . . . a recognition of human beings as the most
distinctive and important feature of the universe which confronts our
senses, and of the function of law as the historic means of guaranteeing
that pre-eminence. . . jurisprudence [which in a scientific age] asks, in
effect, what is the nature of man, and what is the nature of the universe
with which he is confronted . . Why is a human being important;
what gives him dignity; what limits his freedom to do whatever he
likes; what are his essential needs; whence comes his sense of injus-
tice."4 Thus, for him in that area a legal concept is most worthwhile
when it becomes relevant to the homely experiences of individual
human beings.
But he has a different view of the role of the judge in reviewing
administrative agency cases. His court, says the newsmagazine article,
is the federal system's second most important because "[it] decide[s] if
Federal regulatory agencies" that "proclaim rules governing Ameri-
cans' air, health, food and job[s] have themselves followed the law.' 5
In that role, Chief Judge Wright said in his Biddle Lecture "I believe
the judges should retrench from their disposition to act as the final arbi-
ters of the public good. We should, I think, be more reluctant than we
have been to fault the other agencies of government and, also, more
hesitant about filling the void when, in our judgment, the elected
branches of government should have acted and failed .... We tend to
forget that, once upon a time, it was not self-evident that judges had
any business overseeing the work of departments or other agencies of
government, except only as it was charged that constitutional rights had
been violated. I am now wondering out loud why that is not the right
2. O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law, 5 NATURAL LAW FORUM 83, 96-97
(1960) (footnotes omitted).
3. Francis Biddle Lecture by Chief Judge Wright, Harvard Law School (Oct. 16,
1979), reprinted in 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.-(1980).
4. ABA REPORT ON NEW TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL Pm-
LOSOPHY 506 (1964).
5. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 99.
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rule; why courts should do no more than keep administrators within
constitutional bounds."
6
I don't think this marks Chief Judge Wright a Jobbist to that ex-
tent. Rather, I see it as further evidence of a quality so evident in his
work of thirty years on the federal bench: the belief that what the law
provides is a method for seeking wisdom, not wisdom itself.
Chief Judge Wright is a quiet, modest man, more embarrassed
than happy with praise. That makes only the more fitting the dedica-
tion of this issue of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly in his
honor, in Learned Hand's words to "Acclaim one who-all unaware of
his deserts-has so richly earned our gratitude."
6. Francis Biddle Lecture by Chief Judge Wright, Harvard Law School (Oct. 16,
1979), reprinted in 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.--(1980).
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